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TORTS-STRICT LIABILITY FOR SERVICES
CHEVRON v. SUTTON
Plaintiff Sutton brought suit for wrongful death against thepetitioner, Chevron Oil Company, service station lessee Lee Sharp
and Sharp's employee, Herbert R. Buss. Sutton's wife died as a result
of injuries sustained in an automobile accident which occurred when
a wheel that Buss had repaired came off the auto. The District court
granted Chevron's motion for a summary judgment. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals, the summary judgment was reversed. One of thegrounds for its decision was that the theory of strict liability was
applicable:
We hold that Chevron is strictly liable for the torts of Sharp andBuss regardless of the legal relationship created by Chevron. This
responsibility is placed on Chevron for the protection of the motor-
ing public who consumes the product or uses the services of the
station operator.'
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded
the cause to the District court for action consistent with its opinion
that, depending on the facts, Chevron might be liable on two possible
theories, neither of them being strict liability:
One of the grounds upon which the Court of Appeals based itsdecision was that of strict liability. We discussed this doctrine atlength in Stang v. Hertz Corporation, 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732(1972). Nothing we said in our decision in that case can properly be
enlarged or extended to embrace the factual situation here.2
On June 15, 1968, Standard Oil Company, the lessor, leased the
service station and premises to Leland A. Sharp. On the same day,Standard Oil Co., as a seller, entered into a "sales agreement" with
Sharp as "buyer," in which Standard agreed to sell and deliver gas-
oline, motor fuel, lubrication oil and petroleum products to Sharp,
and Sharp agreed to purchase and sell. Should any of these parties be
held liable for the sale of a defective service? To answer that question
we must understand the history of the development of the strict
liability concept to further aid us in the analysis of strict liability
1. Sutton v. Chevron Oil Co., 85 N.M. 604, 514 P.2d 1301 (1973).
2. Chevron Oil Co. v. Sutton, 85 N.M. 679, 515 P.2d 1283 (1973).
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with regard to services rendered alone or services rendered in combi-
nation with the sale of a product.
Since the early days of the common law those engaged in the
business of selling food intended for human consumption have been
held to a high degree of responsibility for their products. As long ago
as 1266 there were enacted special criminal statutes imposing penal-
ties upon victualers, vintners, brewers, butchers, cooks, and other
persons who supplied "corrupt" food and drink.' In the earlier part
of this century this ancient attitude was reflected in a series of deci-
sions in which the courts of a number of states sought to find some
method of holding the seller of food liable to the ultimate consumer
even though there was no showing of negligence on the part of the
seller.4 These decisions represented a departure from, and an excep-
tion to, the general rule that a supplier of chattels was not liable to
third persons in the absence of negligence or privity of contract.
At first, these decisions displayed considerable ingenuity in evolv-
ing more or less fictional theories of liability to fit particular fact
setting. The various devices included an agency of the intermediate
dealer or another to purchase for the consumer, or to sell for the
seller; a theoretical assignment of the seller's warranty to the inter-
mediate dealer; a third party beneficiary contract; and an implied
representation that the food was fit for consumption because it was
placed on the market; as well as numerous others. Recently the
courts have become more or less agreed upon the theory of a "war-
ranty" from the seller to the consumer, either "running with the
goods" by analogy to a covenant running with the land, or made
directly to the consumer. Other decisions have indicated that the
basis is merely one of strict liability in tort, which is not dependent
upon either contract or negligence.'
Since 1950, the decisions have extended this special rule of strict
liability beyond the seller of food for human consumption. The first
extension was into the closely analogous cases of other products
intended for intimate bodily use. Cosmetics, for example, where the
application to the body of the consumer is external rather than
internal. Beginning in 1958 with a Michigan case involving cinder
building blocks, a number of decisions have discarded any limitation
to intimate association with the body, and have extended the rule 
of
strict liability to cover the sale of any product, which, if defective,
3. Restatement of Torts 2d, Explanatory Note 402A, comment b at 348-349 (1965).
4. Id.
5. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. (1966), discussing the landmark case
of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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may be expected to cause physical harm to the consumer or his
property.
6
The courts have not allowed the expansion of the strict liability
concept to persons rendering either professional or nonprofessional
services,7 but this disallowance has not been applied where defen-
dant rendered ultrahazardous services8 or where the transaction was
in part a sale and in part the furnishing of services. 9 The expansion
of the scope of strict liability with regard to services can be shown by
the decisions in cases involving beauty parlors, one of the most wide-
spread service industries in the United States.
Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., supra, involved the liability of a
beauty parlor operator for injury to a patron's hair and scalp result-
ing from a product used in giving a permanent wave. Alluding to
Magrine v. Krasnica, the court stated:
Defendants claim that to hold them to strict liability would be con-
trary to Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A2d 539 (Cty.
Ct. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223,
241, A2d 637 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd 53 N.J. 259, 250 A2d 129(1969). We cannot agree. Magrine, a patient of the defendant-
dentist, was injured when a hypodermic needle being used, con-
cededly with due care, to administer a local anesthetic broke off in
his gum or jaw. The parties agreed that the break resulted from a
latent defect in the needle. It was held that the strict liability in tort
doctrine was not applicable to the professional man, such as a den-
tist, because the essence of the relationship with his patient was the
furnishing of professional skill and services. We accepted the view
that a dentist's bill for services should be considered as representing
pay for that alone. The use of instruments, or the administration of
medicines or the providing of medicines for the patient's home con-
sumption cannot give the ministrations the cast of a commercial
transaction. Accordingly the liability of the dentist in cases involving
6. Id. at 804.
7. Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super 228, 227, A.2d 539, affd sub nom Magrine v.
Spector, 100 N.J. Super 223, 241 A.2d 637, affd without op. 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129(dentist not liable for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff when, because of defect,hypodermic needle broke off in plaintiff's gum); Barbee v. Rogers (Tex) 125 S.W.3d 342(optometrist not strictly liable for improper fitting of contact lenses); La Rossa v. Scientific
Design Co. (1968, Ch 3 N.J.) 402 F.2d 937, 29 A.L.R.3d 1416 (strict liability held inappli-
cable to services rendered by an engineering company in the construction of a chemicalplant); Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Service Co. (1967, Alaska, 427 P.2d 833(strict liability not applicable to one who rendered boiler repair services).
8. Luthringer v. Moore 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d (1948).
9. A beauty parlor operator administering treatment with a defective product may be
held strictly liable for injuries to a customer. Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc. 54 N.J. 585, 258A.2d 697 (1969) (where court considered the treatment both a service and a sale of the
defective product).
May 1974]
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the ordinary relationship of doctor and patient must be tested 
by
principles of negligence, i.e., lack of due care and not by application
of the doctrine of strict liability in tort. o
A service station provides in part a sale of a product and in part 
the
furnishing of a service. A mechanic is not a defined professional 
as is
a dentist so the transaction portion of selling the product should 
not
be eradicated. The court in Newmark went further to provide:
Defendants suggest that there is no doctrinal basis for distinguishing
the services rendered by a beauty parlor operator from those ren-
dered by a dentist or a doctor, and that consequently the liability of
all three should be tested by the same principles. On the contrary
there is a vast difference in the relationships. The beautician is en-
gaged in a commercial enterprise; the dentist and doctor in a profes-
sion. The former caters publicly not to a need but to a form of
aesthetic convenience or luxury, involving the rendition of nonpro-
fessional services and the application of products for which a charge
is made. The dentist or doctor does not and cannot advertise for
patients; the demand for his services stems from a felt necessity of
the patient. In response to such a call the doctor, and to a somewhat
lesser degree the dentist, exercises his best judgment in diagnosing
the patient's ailment or disability, prescribing and sometimes fur-
nishing medicines or other methods of treatment which he believes,
and in some measure hopes, will relieve or cure the condition. His
performance is not mechanical or routine because each patient re-
quires individual study and formulation of an informed judgment as
to the physical or mental disability or condition presented, and the
course of treatment needed. Neither medicine nor dentistry is an
exact science; there is no implied warranty of cure or relief. There is
no representation of infallibility and such professional men should
not be held to such a degree of perfection. There is no guaranty that
the diagnosis is correct. Such men are not producers or sellers of
property in any reasonably acceptable sense of the term.' 
1
The providing of services by an establishment such as a service
station can be more readily analogyzed to the beauty parlor since:
(1) the service station relies on advertising; (2) the service station is a
commercial enterprise; (3) the parties involved do not "hope" the
condition of the Toyota will be relieved, rather that it will be fixed;
(4) the mechanic does not individually diagnose a customer to per-
form the service; (5) the mechanic's performance is usually mechan-
ical and routine since he works on the same types of cars year 
after
year; (6) there is a representation of infallibility by some service
stations as to their repairs which might lead to the belief that 
the
10. 258 A.2d at 702.
11. 258 A.2d at 702-03.
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infallibility is that of the major companies who finance and many
times control these stations;' 2 and (7) the stations are sellers ofproperty in the accepted reasonable sense of the term.
In another line of cases involving hospitals, strict liability has beenheld not applicable in certain situations and applicable in other situa-
tions. In Baptista v. Saint Barnabas Medical Center,' ' strict tort or
warranty liability was found inapplicable to the transfusion of in-
compatible blood. In so holding the court provided:
Whatever may be the final policy decision to be reached in casesinvolving blood infected with viral hepatitis, we find no justificationfor extending the doctrine of strict liability to a case such as this
where the blood is not infected or defective.
To adopt such a rule would be to make a hospital an insurer of what
are in essence medical services and opinions, the cross-matching andtyping of blood. In our view, the same policy considerations whichled the court in Newmark v. Gimbel's, Incorporated, 54 N.J. 585,596-597, 258 A2d 697 (1969), to hold that the rules of strict liabil-ity in tort and implied warranty should not be imposed on dentists
and doctors, apply to the services rendered by defendant hospital inthis case. The obligation of hospital in cross-matching and typingblood in cases of blood tranfusions should continue to be as it is
now, grounded and expressed in a duty to exercise reasonable com-
petence and care. (emphasis supplied)
The same distinctions made by Newmark apply here, and, again we
can distinguish the transfusion of blood from the servicing of an
automobile in like manner. Much seems to hinge on the difficulty of
12. Sutton v. Chevron Oil Co., 85 N.M. 604, 514 P.2d 1301 (1973) where the facts
included that:
Prior to authorizing Chevron and Sharp to repair his Toyota, Sutton relied on
statements made to him that Chevron had more skillful repairmen, was supe-
rior, and specialized in servicing and repair work on vehicles of his kind, theToyota; that Sharp and Buss were agents and employees of Chevron. In addi-tion to signs, uniforms, credit cards and credit privileges, Sutton relied onChevron advertising in the classified section of the Albuquerque telephonedirectory. Here, Chevron states:
At the Sign of the Chevron, we take better care of your car with famousChevron Gasolines and Motor Oils. Also Atlas Tires, Batteries, andAccessories sold on the Chevron Easy-Payment Plan.
"WHERE TO GET SERVICE"
Dealers (Emphasis added)Below are listed a large number of Chevron service station operations among
which are included those which perform auto repairs, tune-ups, brakes, Amer-ican and foreign car repair, and other forms of service. It advertises "AMechanic on Duty." This advertising can lead the public to believe Chevron
exercises control over its service stations; also, Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, aff'd on rehearing, 168 Wash. 465, 15 P.2d 1118(1932), where the seller's strict liability was enlarged by express representa-
tions.
13. 109 N.J. Super 217, 262 A.2d 902, 906-907 (1970).
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analyzing and diagnosing the ailments of a human being. The vari-
ables one deals with in analyzing an automobile are not as complex
as the variables dealt with in analyzing a human being.
However, even in blood transfusion cases, it has been held that a
hospital can be strictly liable where the patient contracted serum
hepatitis from transfused blood. The court held in Cunningham v.
MacNeal Memorial Hospital1 4 that:
The question before court was whether doctrine of strict tort liabil-
ity applied in cases where plaintiff allegedly contracts serum hepati-
tis from transfused blood; court noted that basis of strict liability,
even in earliest unwholesome food cases, was not implied warranty
but public policy, and rejected defense contentions that blood was
not a product and was not subject of a sale, citing numerous cases,
including Russell, N 7 supra in text; court stated:
We believe it is realistic and reasonable to hold that a sale is involved
in the transaction whereby the patient comes into possession of
blood. On oral argument in the case before us counsel for the hos-
pital stated that a sale was not involved; that rather, there was an
exchange of personal property for remuneration. That is an attempt
to make a distinction without a difference. We agree with the
opinion in Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., supra, that to
take a sale and twist into a service is a distortion.
Here the court is probably looking at a much more clear situation
involving the control of the blood received by the hospital. When the
blood is pure there is no way to tell how the deaths or complications
occurred. When the blood is infected, one can tell very easily and be
reasonably accurate in attaching the blame to the tranfusion. In
Brody v. Overlook Hospital,1 a 1972 case, the court held:
Both a hospital and a blood bank could be liable to widow of de-
ceased who was given blood which caused serum hepatitis. "The
imposition of strict liability is predicated, not upon fault, but upon
physical control over the defective product at a time when the prod-
uct is in fact defective." The court also stated: "Since hospitals
patronize the bank charging the lowest fee, there will be greater
demand for blood from the bank with the better safety record. The
incidence of hepatitis infection must thus be reduced."
With an auto part, someone in the "chain" has very good control
over the variables that determine the effectiveness of the repair.
14. Personal Injury, Actions, Defenses, Damages, Vol. 4B, Supplement, p. 20, Matthew
Bender, referring to Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital at 113 Il. App. 2d 74, 251
N.E.2d 733 (1969).
15. 296 A.2d 668 (N.J. Super 1972); See also Jackson v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 8
Wash. 83, 505 P.2d 139 (1972), on the issue of "control."
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Again, establishments such as service stations are commercial enter-
prises, the product or service involved is fully visible and capable of
being checked for defects. It is safe to say that a "sale" is involved
any time mechanical services are performed.
From the history of strict liability throughout the United States
we saw that it was adopted to meet changing conditions in the
economy. Perhaps the law at times has lagged behind these changes,
rather than preceding or arising concurrently, but public policy
demands forced it to adjust. A need appeared, as in the "food sale"
abuses; and the law responded. An example of this process in New
Mexico came about in the leasing area, where it was impossible to
meet public policy demands in favor of teaching lessors because of
the intermediate lessee. The law responded and made the lessor
strictly liable:
We feel that the conditions and the needs of the times make it
appropriate for the changes as we are here making. Most of the states
who have adopted strict liability have done so through the judicial
system. 1 6
This leaves us at the frontier of deciding whether it is appropriate
to extend the doctrine of strict liability to the area of services. Not
only must the use of the strict liability doctrine in particular situa-
tions appear sound from a hypothetical viewpoint, but the appropri-
ate fact situation must arise for the courts to initially extend the
doctrine and be able to forecast the possible ramifications of that
extension.
The amount and increase of service employment in New Mexico' 7
16. Stang v. Hertz, 83 N.M. 730, 735 P.2d 732 (1972).
17. New Mexico Estimated Civilian Work Force, Unemployment, and Employment,
"New Mexico Bureau of Labor Statistics" shows that the number of employees engaged in
manufacturing increased from 16,700 to 21,300 from 1960 to 1971 which is an increase of
27.5%. The increase from 1960 to 1971 of service employees was 49,400 to 62,400, an
incrase of 26.3%. Furthermore, manufacturing has accounted for approximately 7% of total
non-agricultural employment while services have accounted for about 21% of non-agricul-
tural employment.
New Mexico Manufacturing Non-ag employment
7.1% 1960 16,700 = % x 236,300
6.6% 1968 18,200 = % x 276,700
7.1% 1971 21,300 = % x 300,800
New Mexico Wholesale and Retail Trade which includes items such as General Merchandis-
ing, Food Stores, Auto Dealers and Service Stations, Eating and Drinking places:
New Mexico Wholesale-Retail Trade Non-ag employment
21.% 1960 49,400 = % x 236,300
21.% 1968 57,700 = % x 276,700
21.% 1971 62,400 = % x 300,800
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and throughout the United States' 8 is indication enough that the
sheer volume of possible service-torts must have increased over the
years, with a corresponding increase in litigation. In New Mexico for
September 1, 1973, the number of employees engaged in the whole-
sale and retail trade of auto dealers and service stations alone ac-
counted for approximately 16.0% of total retail and wholesale
trade.' 9 If strict liability were to include all retail and wholesale
establishments, it would account for 22.0% of total non-agricultural
employment, 2" while total manufacturing would account for 8.3%
of total non-agricultural employment.2" There is a greater need to
simplify litigation in New Mexico, where services are predominant,
than in many other states where manufacturing is a much greater
proportion of the economic activity. Yet other states have used the
strict liability concept to a much greater extent,2 2 at least prior to
the Court of Appeals' decision in Chevron v. Sutton. 3
The Supreme Court of New Mexico set forth the historical devel-
opment of strict liability in tort as applied to products liability cases
18. United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Establishment Data- Historical Employ-
ment-Employees on non-agricultural payrolls by industry division, shows that the number
of employees in manufacturing increased 17.8% from 1960 to 1968. The increase from
1960 to 1968 of service employees was 23.6%. Furthermore, manufacturing has accounted
for approximately 30% of non-agricultural employment while service employment has
accounted for approximately 21% of total non-agricultural employment.
U.S. Manufacturing Non-ag employment
31.0% 1960 16,796,000 = % x 54,234,000
29.1% 1968 19,781,000 = % x 67,915,000
Wholesale and
U.S. Retail Trade Non-ag employment
21.0% 1960 11,391,000 = % x 54,234,000
21.0% 1968 14,084,000 = % x 67,915,000
19. Employees in the Wholesale and
Retail Trade of Auto Dealers and Total Wholesale
Service Stations and Retail Trade
12,300 = 16.0% 78,300
New Mexico Estimated Civilian Work Force, Unemployment, Employment, "New Mexico
Bureau of Labor Statistics"
20. All Retail and Wholesale Establishments Total Non-Ag Employment
78,300 = 22.0% x 355,000
New Mexico Estimated Civilian Work Force, Unemployment, Employment, "New Mexico
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
21. Total Manufacturing Total Non-Ag Employment
29,400 = 8.3% x 355,000
New Mexico Estimated Civilian Work Force, Unemployment, Employment, "New Mexico
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
22. Prosser, supra note 5, at 794-798.
23. Sutton v. Chevron, 85 N.M. 604, 514 P.2d 1301 (1973).
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and extended the doctrine to the lessor of an automobile in Stang v.
Hertz Corporation.24 In extending strict liability to lessors, the
Court said:
It is apparent from a reading of the Restatement, and the leading
cases on this subject, that the doctrine of strict liability was evolved
to place liability on the party primarily responsible for the injury
occurring, that is, the manufacturer of the defective product. This is
based on reasons of public policy. Inherent in these policy consider-
ations is not the nature of the transaction by which the consumer
obtained possession of the defective product, but the character of the
defect itself; that is, one occurring in the manufacturing process and
the unavailability of an adequate remedy on behalf of the injured
plaintiff. For this reason, I find no logical basis for differentiating
between the liability to an injured consumer of a dealer who is in the
business of selling an automobile which is in a defective condition
because of the manufacture thereof, and a dealer who is in the
business of leasing the automobile. 
2 5
One justification for strict liability has been said to be that the
seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has
assumed a special responsibility toward all members of the consum-
ing public who may be injured by it. The public has the right to and
does expect that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods. Pub-
lic policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by
products intended for consumption be placed upon those who mar-
ket them, and be treated as a cost of production.2 6 The consumer is
entitled to a maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and
the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products.2 7
There is no difference in principle between a lessor of cars and a
service station that performs repairs faultily, thereby exposing the
public to the same quantum of potential harm as a defectively pro-
duced or leased auto.
24. Stang v. Hertz, 83 N.M. 730, 497, P.2d 732 (1972).
25. Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz. App. 32. 467 P.2d 256, (1970).
26. It should be noted that strict liability covers not only specific damages such as
medical expenses and lost income, but can also cover the less easily quanitified item of pain
and suffering. Franklin, 24, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, Stan.
L.R. 439 (1972).
27. A bailor for hire, such as a person in the U-drive-it business, puts motor vehicles in
the stream of commerce in a fashion not unlike a manufacturer or retailer. * ** The very
nature of the business is such that the bailee, his employees, passengers and the traveling
public are exposed to a greater quantum of potential danger of harm from defective vehicles
than usually arises out of sales by the manufacturer. We held in Santor the liability of the
manufacturer might be expressed in terms of strict liability in tort. Santor v. A&M Kara-
gheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52 66-67, 207 A.2d 305; * * * By analogy the same rule should be
made applicable to the U-drive-it bailor-bailee relationship. Such a rental must be regarded
as accompanied by a representation that the vehicle is fit for operation on the public
highways.
May 1974]
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What would be the practical result as far as service establishments
such as gas stations are concerned if the concept of strict liability
were expanded in New Mexico? Putting it in the scope of the free
market system, Chevron and other companies might react, at worst,
by disallowing stations to perform certain repairs. This policy would
cause marginal stations to close, since they supplement their income
through repair work in order to survive. However, one of the ideas
behind strict liability is to eliminate processes which operate at
"below par" standards or at least force improvement of standards.
With the abundance of service stations already operating, the elimina-
tion of those operating "below par" would probably be negligible
and the entry by those who could maintain adequate standards
would soon replace those eliminated. This can be described as a
resource allocation justification.2 8
Why did the Supreme Court reject the opportunity to utilize the
concept of strict liability in Chevron v. Sutton? It has been said that
the adoption of the doctrine of strict liability appears likely to in-
volve a change in theory more than a change in the results which are
reached under other theories of products liability 2 9 The reversal and
remanding of Sutton v. Chevron, supra, to the District court will
probably result in the same verdict that was reached by the New
Mexico Court of Appeals using strict liability. However, the District
court will most likely depend on apparent authority and agency by
estoppel doctrines. The result is the use of much more time, money,
and more complicated procedures3" than would have been used had
the District court in the initial proceedings relied on the strict liabil-
ity doctrine, or had the litigation terminated at the Court of Appeals
level where strict liability was adopted. The courts of New Mexico
could reach similar decisions in the much more simple manner.
Utilizing the definition of strict liability in the Restatement of
Torts3  2nd that was used for the New Mexico Appellate Court's
28. Consumers should be informed of the true costs of products in the marketplace, and
the price charged by the producer should include not only the costs of labor and materials,
but the social costs of the product as well. If social costs are not reflected in price, then
there will be excessive demand for underpriced products and the overall allocation of
resources throughout society will be distorted. In defective-product of service cases, this
argument would require that if two products or services appear similar in function and cost
of repair or manufacture, but onecauses users or bystanders many more personal injuries,
their prices would reflect this differential so that consumers can be aware of the actual
social costs of the products. Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a
Proposal, 24 Stan. L Rev. (1972).
29. Prosser, supra note 5, at 804.
30. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1123-1124 (1960).
31. Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 402A, Special Liability of Seller of Product for Phys-
ical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
[Vol. 4
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adoption of the strict liability doctrine in Chevron v. Sutton, supra,
and subsequent cases expanding the concept of strict liability, it is
evident that the expansion of this theory to encompass services is
feasible. Furthermore Chevron v. Sutton provides a fact situation
which lends itself to the use of the strict liability theory in the area
of services. It is no longer logical to restrict § 402A to products. In
enunciating the general concept of strict liability, the courts have
stripped away the vestigal remnants which rendered the warranty
action so cumbersome and inadequate, and have restored simplicity
and attention to substance (rather than form) in the field of products
liability. Why not extend the theory to nonprofessional services,
especially when the sale of a product is involved?
TITO D. CHAVEZ
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his propety, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contrac-
tual relation with the seller.
May 1974]
